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NEGLIGENCE-LAST CLEAR CHANCE-INEXTRICABLE POSITION
REQUIREMENT IN NEW MExICo*-The doctrine of last clear chance
is operative in New Mexico when it appears that: (1) the plaintiff
was negligent, (2) the plaintiff as a result of his negligence was in a
position of peril from which he could not escape by the exercise of
ordinary care, (3) the defendant knew or should have known of the
plaintiff's peril, and (4) the defendant had a clear chance to avoid the
injury by the exercise of ordinary care, and he failed to do so.'
When is the second requirement, that the plaintiff be in an inex-
tricable position of peril, satisfied for the purpose of invoking the
doctrine of last clear chance? The inextricable position requirement
is satisfied when the plaintiff is in a position of peril and either
( 1 ) "physically unable" to avoid injury or (2) "totally unaware" of
the impending peril.2 The "physically unable" plaintiff may invoke
last clear chance if the defendant saw or should have seen the plaintiff,
realized or should have realized his peril, and had a clear chance to
avoid the accident.' The "totally unaware" plaintiff, however, can
invoke the doctrine only if the defendant actually saw the plaintiff.'
The purpose of this comment is to discuss the situation where a
"totally unaware" plaintiff seeks to invoke the doctrine, but the de-
fendant denies that he actually saw the plaintiff.
In Burnham v. Yellow Checker Cab, Inc.,' the plaintiff-pedestrian
was crossing to the west side of a well-lighted street.' The plaintiff
was negligent per se7 in attempting to cross at a place other than the
crosswalk. Before stepping from the curb, the plaintiff looked to the
south and saw the lights of a car a block or a block and a half away;
the plaintiff then walked to a place near the center of the street and
* Burnham v. Yellow Checker Cab, Inc., 391 P.2d 413 (N.M. 1964).
1. Burnham v. Yellow Checker Cab, Inc., 391 P.2d 413 (N.M. 1964); Bryan v.
Phillips, 70 N.M. 1, 369 P.2d 37 (1962) ; Lucero v. Torres, 67 N.M. 10, 350 P.2d 1028
(1960) ; Blewett v. Barnes, 62 N.M. 300, 309 P.2d 976 (1957) ; Merrill v. Stringer, 58
N.M. 372, 271 P.2d 405 (1954) ; Sanchez v. Gomez, 57 N.M. 383, 259 P.2d 346 (1953) ; Le
Doux v. Martinez, 57 N.M. 86, 254 P.2d 685 (1953) ; Floeck v. Hoover, 52 N.M. 193,
195 P.2d 86 (1948).
2. Bryan v. Phillips, supra note 1; Sanchez v. Gomez, supra note 1; Merrill v.
Stringer, supra note 1 ; Thayer v. Denver & R.G.R.R., 21 N.M. 330, 154 Pac. 691 (1916).
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. 391 P.2d 413 (N.M. 1964).
6. Ibid. A test was made and there was sufficient light for reading a newspaper at
the scene of the accident.
7. Ibid. See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 64-14-17 (1953).
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stopped.8 The plaintiff testified that at this point she was distracted
by a car on the west side of the street. The defendant's taxicab was
proceeding north and struck the plaintiff at a point some two or three
feet east of the center line in the northbound lane of traffic.1"
The taxicab driver testified that he was looking ahead all the time
and that his view was unobstructed, but that he did not actually see
the plaintiff until he applied his brakes in an attempt to avoid the
accident."
The trial court denied the plaintiff's request for an instruction on
the doctrine of last clear chance, and entered judgment upon a verdict
for the defendant. The New Mexico Supreme Court, held, Reversed
and Remanded, 12 stating that the failure to instruct the jury concern-
ing last clear chance was erroneous. The supreme court reasoned
that the requirement of inextricable position was met by the plaintiff's
total unawareness of her peril,'8 and that the defendant's denial that
he actually saw the plaintiff in time to avoid the accident was not con-
clusive. The court applied the general rule which states that when
there is evidence from which the jury could reasonably infer that the
defendant actually saw the plaintiff, the determination of that issue
must be left to the jury.' 4
8. Ibid. Mrs. Burnham either stopped in the north-bound lane of traffic and did not
move or she stopped between the yellow divider lines and then stepped back into the
north-bound lane. This is not clear from the testimony.
9. 391 P.2d at 414.
10. Ibid.
11. 391 P.2d at415:
On the other hand, both the driver and passenger of the Holler car [a south-
bound car that had stopped to let the plaintiff cross] saw Mrs. Burnham cross-
ing the street in time to stop the Holler car before reaching Mrs. Burnham
... . Gonzales [driver of taxicab] testified that he was not blinded by lights
[of the Holler car] until just as he applied his brakes.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
In Merrill v. Stringer, 58 N.M. 372, 376-77, 271 P.2d 405, 409 (1954) (emphasis the
court's), the court quoted from Gillette v. City & County of San Francisco, 58 Cal. App.
2d 434, 437, 136 P.2d 611, 615 (Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1943), where a similar situation arose:
'The courts have held repeatedly that it is a question of fact for the jury to
determine from all the circumstances presented by the evidence whether the de-
fendant actually knew of the plaintiff's peril; and that notwithstanding there
may be a total absence of any positive testimony that the defendant actually
knew of plaintiff's danger, and even though the defendant definitely denies see-
ing the plaintiff at all, the doctrine of last clear chance may be invoked and ap-
plied where the facts and circumstances are such as would justify the jury in
finding that despite the defendant's denial of knowledge or the absence of direct
testimony on the subject, he was actually 'aware of plaintiff's danger in time to
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Merrill v. Stringer,5 the leading New Mexico decision on last
clear chance, cannot be distinguished from Burnham on the facts or
the law. In Merrill, the plaintiff-pedestrian was crossing to the north
side of an east-west thoroughfare. She was running in a northwest-
erly direction, outside the crosswalk, and apparently was oblivious
to the west bound traffic. The defendant was traveling west in the
lane next to the center of the street. The plaintiff either ran or walked
into his path and was seriously injured. The defendant denied seeing
the plaintiff at any time prior to impact. However, the street was
well lighted, and others in the area saw the plaintiff and realized her
peril.16 The defendant's motion for directed verdict was granted.
The New Mexico Supreme Court reversed,'17 stating that the circum-
stances demanded that the issue of whether the defendant actually
saw the plaintiff must be submitted to the jury. The court reasoned
that the inextricable position requirement was satisfied by the plain-
tiff's unawareness; if there had been an actual seeing by the defend-
ant, the last clear chance doctrine would apply. This holding clearly
represents previous New Mexico case law and was recognized as
controlling in Burnham.8
Looking only at Merrill and Burnham, it would appear that New
Mexico case law is well settled on the question of whether the inex-
tricable position requirement can be satisfied by a "totally unaware"
plaintiff in the face of a denial by the defendant of having actually
seen the plaintiff. However, some confusion was created in this area
by the decision in Bryan V. Phillips." In Bryan, the plaintiff was at-
tempting to cross an intersection. Because there were puddles of mud
and water on the street, the plaintiff took an erratic course outside
the crosswalk. She was in the defendant's lane of traffic at the time
she was struck by the defendant's car. The defendant was driving
about twenty to twenty-five miles per hour and stated that she had
not seen the plaintiff prior to the accident. At the time of the ac-
avert the accident; in other words, that he "must have known" of plaintiff's
danger.'
See also Bell v. Ware, 69 N.M. 308, 366 P.2d 706 (1961) ; Sanchez v. Gomez, 57 N.M.
383, 259 P.2d 346 (1953) ; Lucero v. Harsley, 50 N.M. 1, 165 P.2d 578 (1946) ; Smith v.
Gamp, 178 Wash. 451, 35 P.2d 40 (1934) ; Thompson v. Albuquerque Traction Co., 15
N.M. 407, 110 Pac. 552 (1910).
15. 58 N.M. 372, 271 P.2d 405 (1954).
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. See cases cited in note I supra.
19. 70 N.M. 1,369 P.2d 37 (1962).
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cident, dusk had fallen and the streetlights were not on, but visibility
was good.
No witnesses saw the plaintiff prior to impact. At trial, the judge
refused to instruct the jury on the doctrine of last clear chance and
rendered judgment upon a verdict for the defendant.20 The New
Mexico Supreme Court affirmed,2' stating that the plaintiff had not
shown that she was in an inextricable position at the time the defend-
ant's car struck her, and the trial court, therefore, was correct in
refusing to submit the last clear chance issue to the jury.
The Bryan opinion failed to distinguish the two factual situations,
"physical inability" and "total unawareness," that satisfy the inex-
tricable position requirement:
The evidence fails to support the contention that appellant [plaintiff]
was in a position of peril from which she could not have extricated her-
self at any time by the exercise of ordinary care for her own safety
while crossing the intersection. There is no evidence that her neg-
ligence had terminated or culminated in a perilous position from which
there was no escape, or that by the use of ordinary care she could not
have seen appellees' car.22
This language indicates that if by the use of ordinary care, a plain-
tiff could have become aware of his peril, he would not be entitled to
the relief offered by the last clear chance doctrine. Other language
in the Bryan case refutes this interpretation:
The doctrine cannot be invoked where there is concurrent negligence
such as where the injured party's negligence continues up to the very
moment of injury. The exception to this is when the defendant ac-
tually knows of plaintiff's danger, has reason to know that plaintiff
cannot save himself, has a last clear chance to avoid the injury by
exercise of care and fails to do so.2 3 [Emphasis added.]
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
22. Id. at 5-6, 369 P.2d at 40.
23. Id. at 5, 369 P.2d at 39. This language is also misleading. The authorities cited
in Bryan for this proposition limit the exception to situations where concurrent negligence
consisted of negligent inattentiveness. Restatement, Torts, § 480, at 1257-58 (1934) :
A plaintiff who, by exercise of reasonable vigilance could have observed the
danger created by the defendant's negligence in time to have avoided harm
therefrom, may recover if, but only if, the defendant
(a) knew of the plaintiff's situation, and
(b) realized or had reason to realize that the plaintiff was inattentive
[VOL. 5
The basis for the Bryan decision was the determination that the
plaintiff was physically able to remove herself from her perilous posi-
tion; and, therefore, was not in an inextricable position. 4 Apparently,
the court did not consider the total unawareness aspect of the inex-
tricable position requirement. The exception that the last clear chance
doctrine applies when the plaintiff has been totally unaware does not
arise unless the defendant actually saw the plaintiff in time to have
avoided the accident. The plaintiff in Bryan did not contend on ap-
peal that the defendant actually saw the plaintiff at any time prior to
impact.a When one realizes that the Bryan opinion was not dealing
with a total unawareness situation, the apparent confusing language
of the opinion is clarified.
What would have been the result in Bryan if the total unawareness
aspect of the inextricable position requirement had been considered?
It is important that the defendant's denial of actual seeing is not con-
clusive and need not be conceded. In Bryan, there was no dispute
that the plaintiff was totally unaware of the impending peril. There-
fore, if the plaintiff had not conceded that the defendant was un-
aware of the plaintiff's presence, the court would have been presented
with the question of whether the circumstances were such that the
question of actual seeing required a determination by the jury.
What circumstances should be considered in determining whether
a jury question has been raised? It is clear from Merrill and
Burnham that a denial of actual seeing by the defendant is not con-
clusive, even when uncontradicted by direct evidence. 6 Circumstan-
and therefore unlikely to discover his peril in time to avoid
harm, and
(c) thereafter is negligent in failing to utilize with reasonable care
and competence his then existing ability to avoid harming the
plaintiff.
24. Chief Justice Compton was not confronted with that aspect of last clear chance
involving the inattentive plaintiff coupled with an actual seeing by the defendant. The
plaintiff did not contend on appeal that there had been an actual seeing. In fact, the
plaintiff conceded that there was no actual seeing by the defendant prior to impact.
Brief for Appellant, p. 11, Bryan v. Phillips, 70 N.M. 1,369 P.2d 37 (1962):
The Defendant testified that she did not see any pedestrians (TR 158-159).
There was no evidence introduced to controvert this fact. Therefore, it must
be concluded that Defendant did not know of Plaintiff's presence and therefore
could not have known of her peril. The question still remains of whether De-
fendant should have known of Plaintiff's peril.
25. Ibid.
26. Burnham v. Yellow Checker Cab, Inc., 391 P.2d 413 (N.M. 1964); Merrill v.
Stringer, 58 N.M. 372, 271 P.2d 405 (1954).
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tial evidence may be considered by the jury in determining the
question of actual seeing." In Burnham, the court considered the
lighting conditions, the fact that other witnesses saw the plaintiff,
and the testimony that the defendant was looking straight ahead, and
decided that these facts were sufficient to require a jury determina-
tion.2 8
In the California case of Hoy v. Tornich,29 cited with approval
in Merrill, the defendant contended that because the direct evidence
showed that the defendant did not see the plaintiff, the doctrine of
last clear chance was inapplicable. The court held otherwise, saying:
"If the defendant in this case was looking straight ahead, as he testi-
fied that he was, he must have seen the plaintiff." 0
In Bryan, the defendant was looking straight ahead and could see
over 100 feet. She was driving slowly, and had better than normal
vision. While this evidence would apparently be enough to require
submission of the "actual seeing" issue to the jury under the rule laid
down in Hoy, it is clear that a trial court will more easily be per-
suaded to submit the issue to the jury if the plaintiff can show that
other witnesses did in fact see him. These "other witnesses," of
course, were present in Merrill, but not in Bryan. There was a reason-
able question, however, and the argument should have been made in
Bryan that the circumstantial evidence required a submission to the
jury on the question of whether the defendant actually saw the plain-
tiff prior to the impact.
It is important to note that anytime the circumstances indicate that
the defendant should have seen the plaintiff, as in Merrill and Burn-
ham, the question of whether he actually saw the plaintiff must be
determined by a jury regardless of the defendant's denial.
WILLIAM H. CARPENTER
27. Ibid.
28. Burnham v. Yellow Checker Cab, Inc., 391 P.2d 413 (N.M. 1964).
29. 199 Cal. 54-5, 250 Pac. 565 (1926).
30. 250 Pac. at 569. (Emphasis added.)
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